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~ ~7684. 
Case No. 7684 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERT P. NIELSON and BEN H. 
DAVIS, a co-partnership, doing 
business as DAVIS NIELSON 
CONSTRUCTION C 0 M PAN Y, 
and CONTINENTAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs.-
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, KEITH F. HUBBARD, 
WESTERN ASBESTOS COM-
pANY, a corporation, and THE 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR RE-HEARING AND F I LSEOfYG BRIEF 
NOV 2 7 i951sHIRLEY P. JONES, 
______ S.HIRLEY P. JONES, JR., 
---ci~;t::s~~;;;-;;court, utAWorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERT P. XIEL~OX and BEX H. 
DA YI~, a co-partnership, doing 
busine:'s a~ DA YlS KIELSOX 
COXSTRrCTIOX C 0 :JI PAX Y, 
and COXTIXEXTAL C~\SrALTY 
CO:JIP ~\XY. a corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs.-
IXDrSTRL\L CO:JIJIISSIOX OF 
rT~\H, KEITH F·. HUBBARD, 
\YESTERX ASBESTOS COM-
PAXY, a corporation, and THE 
STATE IKSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 7684 
PL~\IXTIFFS' PETITION FOR RE-HEARING AND 
SUPPORTING BRIEF 
Come now the plaintiffs above named and respect-
fully petition this Court for re-hearing in the above en-
titled matter: 
1. The Court misconstrued the findings of the In-
dustrial Commission, failed to give effect to the uncon-
tradicted testimony and by a process of its own reason-
ing made findings and conclusions at variance with those 
of the Industrial Commission. 
2. The Court erred in affirming the award of the 
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Industrial Commission upon the grounds stated in the 
decision herein. 
3. If it is desired to affirm the award of the In-
dustrial Commission, the rule of law heretofore prevail-
ing in this state should be rejected and a definite rule 
announced in accordance with the law hereafter to be ap-
plied, in order to avoid confusion and as a definite guide 
to the Industrial Commission, employees, employers, and 
their insurance carriers. 
In support of the foregoing petition, plaintiffs pre-
sent the following: 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS SUPPORTING THEIR 
PETITION FOR RE-HEARING 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case is before this court on writ of certiorari to 
the Industrial Commission to review an award against 
the plaintiffs and in favor of the defendants. This court 
affirmed the award of the Commission and plaintiffs be-
lieve that the decision of this court upon the grounds 
set forth therein is wrong and will tend to create future 
confusion in the handling and disposition of similar cases. 
In this case there is no hardship upon the employee either 
by reason of the appeal from the Industrial Commission 
or by reason of this petition for re-hearing. The employee 
concededly is entitled to compensation either from the 
plaintiffs or the State Insurance Fund and pending the 
final determination of this case is being paid. The State 
Insurance Fund initially paid compensation, which was 
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later continued by the plaintiff Continental Casualty 
Company after the award of the Industrial Com1nission. 
There is, therefore, no urgency upon the part of the em-
ployee in this case, but there is urgent reason for a re-
consideration by this court of its decision as we shall 
attempt to point out in our argument. The points of the 
argument will be discussed in the san1e order, set forth 
above in the petition for re-hearing. 
ARGU:JIENT 
I. 
THE COURT MISCONSTRUED THE FINDINGS OF THE 
IKDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, FAILED TO GIVE EFFECT 
TO THE UNCONTRADICTED TESTIMONY AND BY A PRO-
CESS OF ITS OWN REASONING MADE FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS AT VARIANCE WITH THOSE OF THE IN-
DUSTRIAL COMMISSION. 
In its decision, the court makes various assertions 
as to what the Industrial Commission found or must 
have found, which do not actually reflect the findings 
of the Commission and which are not supported by the 
record. For instance, in the 3rd paragraph of the deci-
sion, the court says "It is obvious that the Commission 
concluded that no herniation of the lumbosacral disc oc-
curred at the time of the first strain, but that such herni-
ation did occur at the time of the second." Actually the 
Commission found that "applicant's injury of October 24, 
1949 did such damage to his lumbosacral disc that de-
generation began." (R. 82) Also, "the referee, therefore, 
finds that the condition resulting from applicant's injury 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
of October 2+, 1949, was aggravated, * * * by his injury 
of July 18, 1950." Degeneration is one of the processes 
of herniation. Herniation is the protrusion of an organ 
or a part thereof through the opening in the walls of 
its natural cavity. 
The testimony of all the doctors, including Dr. Rob-
inson, is positive that the herniation commenced with the 
first injury. Dr. Robinson when pressed on cross exam-
ination as to what is the cause of the pain stated, "when 
the disc ruptures a portion of the substance extrudes 
and presses on the nerves in the spinal canal." (R. 54) 
The pain itself is the evidence of the rupture. Dr. Hol-
brook, (R. 63-64) testified that even if the patient, after 
the first accident and injury, had recovered to the extent 
that he had no pain, the doctor would still be of the opin-
ion that the first accident was the cause of his hernia; 
that he could have been normal between the two accidents 
and his opinion would still be the same, to wit: that the 
herniation or degeneration was initiated by the original 
injury and further aggravated by the second injury. (R. 
59) Dr. Holbrook also stated that he would still be of 
this opinion even if the patient suffered immediate and 
severe pain after the second accident because, "we know 
that one of the characteristics of herniated discs is that 
they may have pain in their backs and that may subside 
and they may be symptom-free and the period may vary 
between weeks and years until the patient will have more 
symptoms." 
Q. "What happens to the disc itself in those 
periods? 
A. "Apparently the disc protruded somewhat and 
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pressed on the nerYes and then the pressure is relieved 
by the extruded 1naterial where it no longer interferes 
with the nerYe roots.'' (R. G-t) The record is quite clear 
that the protrusion of the disr 1naterial causes pain 
and that that is a characteristic of "herniated discs." 
There is no question frmn the record that the e1nployee 
sustained a herniation of the disc by the first injury 
which later subsided when the extruded material no 
longer interferred with the nerve roots, and that the 
second injury aggravated the already existing condition. 
Obviously the facts in this case are different than .lEtna 
Life Insurance Company 1-:. Industrial Commission, 64 
rtah -!15, 231 Pac. -!-!:2, because in the ~Etna case, it was 
expressly pointed out that no hernia resulted from the 
first accident, that there had never been any protrusion. 
There was protrusion in this case, there was herni-
ation. The period of pain between the time of the acci-
dent and the time a doctor was consulted is almost identi-
cal in both accidents. Thus, the Court is in error in say-
ing that the Commission concluded that no herniation 
occurred at the time of the first strain because the Com-
mission expressly found that there was damage and 
degeneration and "that the condition resulting from ap-
plicant's injury of October 24, 1949 was aggravated." 
There is an express finding of a condition created or 
caused by the October 24 injury, and that this condi-
tion was later aggravated. 
The court in its decision also says that the Commis-
sion did not treat the second injury as a recurrence of 
an existing first injury. We respectfully submit that 
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the express language of the Commission's findings is 
that the second accident caused a recurrence of an exist-
ing condition. It is impossible to aggravate a condition 
if the condition never existed. It is impossible for the 
first injury to "result in a condition" that was aggra-
vated by the second injury without the second injury 
being a recurrence of the first. 
The court, also, confuses injury with disability. 
There may be an injury with no disability, but it is not 
the occurrence or onset of disability that determines 
either the right of the employee to compensation or the 
person who is liable for such compensation. Our statute 
provides that the factor creating liability is the accident 
causing the injury, not the accident causing the disability, 
42-1-43. That is the whole theory of the cases similar to 
the Continental Casualty Company v. Industrial Com-
mission, 63 Utah 59, 221 Pac. 852, relied upon by the 
plaintiffs in this case. In most, if not all, of the cases 
holding the first employer liable for a recurrence by a 
second accident of an injury incurred while in the em-
ployment of the first employer, the disability from the 
first accident had ended, and the second accident caused 
another disability. Nevertheless, the first em_ployer is 
held liable as the one who caused that injury in the first 
instance. So that the fact that the disability in the pres-
ent case was precipitated by the second injury is im-
material under those cases. And if the court is going to 
follow the Continental Casualty case, this case comes 
squarely under it. If this court is not going to follow the 
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Continental Casualty case, then the decision should so 
state so that confusion will not result. 
In the decision herein, the court 8ays, ''the award 
itself, placing the risk on the second mnployer and its 
carrier, also i8 consistent with the rejection of the recur-
rence idea.'' Of course, we cannot follow that reason-
ing because the Cmnmission squarely said that the July 
lS injury, that is the second injury, was an aggravation 
of the condition that resulted from the first injury. The 
Connnission not only found that there was a first injury, 
(which comrnenced the degeneration or herniation) but 
also squarely found that the second injury was an ag-
gravation of the first. Where the Commission went 
wrong was in applying the aggravation theory to this 
case. The statement of the Commission that the "aggra-
vation theory is too well established to require extended 
comment" is not a mere gratuity, as this court holds, but 
was the very basis and foundation of the Commission's 
decision. The Commission squarely found, and the lan-
guage of the decision itself in this case shows, that the 
second injury was a recurrence of the first. The Con1mis-
sion in stating that the herniation or extrusion was per-
cipitated by the second injury found contrary to the evi-
dence as we have already pointed out, which is that the 
extrusion caused the pain suffered in the first injury and 
the pain subsided when the pressure was relieved by the 
extruded material. (R. 54) As we have shown, even Dr. 
Robinson says that a herniated disc is what causes the 
pain; that the rupture is a portion of the substance ex-
truding and pressing on the nerves in the spinal canal. 
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Herniation is not a single event. Herniation is a process 
that vroceeds either to clear up without surgical relief, 
or progresses to the point where surgical relief is neces-
sary. 
In the present case, everybody, including Dr. Rob-
inson, when he was pinned down as above indicated, 
stated that the herniation began with the first injury. 
Whether or not it would have proceded to completion 
without the intervention of the second accident was not 
demonstrable. But, all the expert testimony was that the 
condition which was surgically corrected began with the 
first injury. 
As above indicated, we submit that the decision is 
in error: (1) in assuming that the Commission's award 
on the aggravation theory was gratuitous (2) that it is 
the one who is the employer at time of disability in-
stead of the one who is the employer at the time the 
injury is caused who is liable, and (3) that herniation 
was a single event, instead of a progressive condition. 
The court in stating that we say that the first accident 
caused the disability is in error. There is no question 
that the disability occurred after the second accident. 
vVhat we contended was that the accident which caused 
the injury was the first accident. 
We, therefore, submit that the decision erroneously 
reflects the findings of the Commission and is also con-
trary to the evidence and to the Continental Casualty 
case, supra. 
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II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION UPON THE GROUNDS 
STATED IN THE DECISION HEREIN. 
We have tried to point out that this case is not simi-
lar to the ..:Etna case, because· in the ..:Etna case, there had 
never been any degeneration or herniation as a result 
of the first accident. We have, also, tried to point out 
that as in the Continental Casualty case, supra, the fact 
that the effects of the first injury had subsided and that 
the second accident caused the disability is not the factor 
that determines liability; that under the law of this state 
as it has heretofore existed liability is determined by 
the accident that causes the initial injury; that accident 
is the proximate cause and all other accidents affecting 
the same injury are recurrences or aggravations, ( aggra-
vation is the same thing as recurrences) and the fact that 
disability results from a subsequent accident does not 
determine which employer is liable. Therefore, if the 
Continental Casualty case is to be a law in this state, the 
decision in this case is wrong. 
III. 
IF IT IS DESIRED TO AFFIRM THE AWARD OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION THE RULE OF LAW HERETO-
FORE PREVAILING IN THIS STATE SHOULD BE RE-
JECTED AND A DEFINITE RULE ANNOUNCED IN AC-
CORDANCE WITH THE LAW HEREAFTER TO BE AP-
PLIED IN ORDER TO A VOID CONFUSION AND AS A 
DEFINITE GUIDE TO THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
EMPLOYEES, EMPLOYERS, AND THEIR INSURANCE 
CARRIERS. 
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The plaintiff, Continental Casualty Uo1npany ever 
since the decision in the Continental Casualty case has 
paid similar claims to the one herein involved where it 
was the carrier for the employer at the time of the first 
accident. So far as we are concerned we have considered 
the law settled in this state. We have made no opposi-
tion to claims where we were the first carrier. If we are 
now also to be held for the second accident, then, of 
course, we are placed in a position where we must contest 
every claim, as there is no certainty which way the In-
dustrial Commission will rule. If it is desired to hold the 
one liable who is the employer when the disability occurs, 
then a different rule should be announced so that there 
will be no uncertainty. The compensation laws were 
designed, as this court has held so many times, to require 
industry to bear the burden of the damage it causes, and 
if it is the employer at the time the actual disability oc-
curs who is the one who causes the actual industrial loss, 
then we submit this court should place its decision 
squarely upon that ground, and overrule the Continental 
Casualty case, so that we will no longer be plagued with 
hair-line distinctions or whimsical opinions of the In-
dustrial Commission. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that the decision as it now stands is 
wrong and that a re-hearing should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SHIRLEY P. JONES, 
SHIRLEY P. JONES, JR., 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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